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Learned Hand's Trademark Jurisprudence: Legal
Positivism and the Myth of the Prophet
Kenneth L. Port
"I hate justice, which means that I know that if a man begins to talk
about that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal
terms."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Learned Hand is considered by nearly all to be one of the most respected
jurists in American legal history. The literature is replete with references to Hand,
depicting him in superlative terms as one of the most accomplished and respected
judges to sit on any United States court.2 Most recently, two of the people most
qualified to make the determination have concluded that Hand was a "great
judge." Gerald Gunther in his biography on Hand (and in subsequent spin-off
* Copyright 1995 Kenneth L. Port. Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
B.A. 1982, Macalester College; J.D. 1989, University of Wisconsin. I am indebted to Gerald Gunther, Peter
Rofes, Michael McChrystal, Whitmore Gray, Christopher Simoni, Edward Fallone, Jay Grenig, John Kidwell,
and Paula D. Port. I am also grateful to Ellen Platt, Sarah Rudolph and Kristin Frye for their valuable research
assistance. Finally, I am grateful to Interim Dean Steve Barkan for his assistance, which made some of the
research for this article possible.
1. THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 435 (Max Learned ed., 1943). This is actually a
quotation of Justice Holmes. Learned Hand was apparently very fond of this statement as epitomizing the role
of judges. See Comments of Whitney North Seymour, 264 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1959) (containing the record
of a special session of the Second Circuit to praise Hand's fifty years of judicial service). Harry Shriver
describes an instance where Learned Hand purposefully set up Justice Holmes to utter this quotation. Hand
apparently told Holmes on departing one another's.company, "Go do justice." Holmes apparently responded
to Hand's delight and expectation, 'That is not my job. I only play the game according to the rules." HARRY
SHRIVER, WHAT GUSTO 10 (1970). As will be made apparent, this, as well as any other quotation, accurately
summarizes Hand's judicial perspective in trademark cases.
2. See, e.g., CHARLES WYZANSKI, JR., LEARNED HAND, THE BmL OFRIGHTS at v (1974) (calling Hand
"the greatest living judge in the English speaking world"); P. HAMBURGER, THE GREAT JUDGE (1946); Gerald
Gunther, Learned Hand, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSITrUTION 895 (1986) (stating that "Hand
is widely viewed, with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, and Benjamin N. Cardozo, as [being]
among the leading American judges of the twentieth century"); Richard Posner, The Material Basis of
Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1993) (arguing that Hand is "the greatest judge in history of the federal
courts of appeals"); Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., An Unabashed Liberal Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme Court,
69 N.C. L. REv. 213, 224 (1990); Bernard Schwartz, ChiefJustice Warren and 1984, 35 HASTINGS Li. 975,
989 (1984) (referring to Hand as "one of the greatest modern jurists"). For further deification of Hand, see
Jerome N. Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1957); Felix Frankfurter,
Learned Hand, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1961); George W. Pepper, The Literary Style of Learned Hand, 60 HARV.
L. REV. 333 (1947). For an interesting assessment of this "homage" to Hand, see Carl Landauer, Scholar,
Craftsman, and Priest: Learned Hand's Self-Imaging, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 231 (1991).
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articles)3 relied on his personal affinity for Hand to conclude that Hand was a
"great judge."4 Also, Judge Richard Posner, based almost exclusively on a
quantitative analysis of the number of times Hand's opinions have been cited in
various courts, concluded that Hand was a great judge
Even though Hand never was promoted to the Supreme Court,6 in his fifty-
plus years as a judge (sitting first in the district court and then in the circuit court),
very few other judges have been canonized as much as Hand.7 In fact, in 1959 the
Second Circuit held a special session to praise Hand's fifty years of judicial ser-
vice. These comments were placed on the record and are reported in the Federal
Reporter." No other judge in American history had received such an honor.
A lawyer, judge or law student who formed his or her entire opinion of
Learned Hand's opinions based on such canonization might expect each decision
he wrote to be a masterpiece, each area of law he touched to be clarified, and each
opinion to be consistent, true, and somehow objectively and normatively a
"correct" statement of the law. Or, at least, these people might expect that his
decisions were still good law today. As this article argues, however, as applied
to Hand's substantive trademark jurisprudence, this is often not the case
3. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: Outstanding Copyright Judge, 41 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 315
(1994); Gerald Gunther, Reflections on Judicial Administration in the Second Circuit, From the Perspective
of Learned Hand's Days, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 505 (1994).
4. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE at xviii (1994); see id. (emoting
that "[Hand] remains my idol still"). For a rather extensive review, see James A. Thomson. Learned Hand:
Evaluating a Federal Judge, 22 N. KY. U. L. REV. 763 (1995).
5. Richard A. Posner, Book Review: The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L. J. 511, 534-40 (1994) [hereinafter Posner, Book Review]. Nevertheless, Posner
criticizes Gunther for being too emotionally attached to the subject of his biography and not focusing on a
substantive review of Hand's contribution. Posner himself draws his conclusion of "judicial greatness" based
almost exclusively on the number of times Hand was cited and not on any substantive analysis of those cases.
See also Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 879-91 (1988)
[hereinafter Posner, Jurisprudence] (arguing that a definition of law comes down to the activities ofjudges).
6. However, the mass media referred to Learned Hand as the Tenth Justice. WYTzANSKI, supra note
2, at v. For a thorough discussion of Hand's frustrations with potential appointment to the Supreme Court, see
Michael A. Kahn, The Politics of the Appointment Process: An Analysis of Why Learned Hand was Never
Appointed to the Supreme Court, 25 STAN. L. REV. 251 (1973).
7. "[Hand] is often described as one of the greatest judges our country has produced." Comments of
Whitney North Seymour, 264 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1959).
8. Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service, 264 F.2d 5-38 (2d Cir. 1959).
9. Not having closely analyzed any specific area of the law other than Hand's trademark opinions, I
make no representation as to whether my thesis is proven or disproven in Hand's opinions on other substantive
areas of the law. Although such a study would be of utmost importance and interest to many, it is beyond the
scope of this article. However, it is important to note that people such as Judge Richard Posner have
characterized Hand's impact on constitutional law as "slight" and "unexciting." Posner, Book Review, supra
note 5, at 520; see also MARVIN SCHtCK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 12 n.23 (1970) (arguing that Hand's
reputation as ajudge is mostly a myth, unsupported by a close examination of his judicial writings). In fact,
one of the other extremely respected jurists in this country, Charles \Vyzanski of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, wrote in an introduction to The Bill of Rights that if the book were taken seriously, democratic
government as we know it in this country would cease to exist. WYZANSKI, supra note 2, at viii. In The Bill
of Rights, Hand argues that the courts do not have the authority to review the constitutionality of legislation.
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Whether a judge is worthy of the type of praise Hand has received should be
evaluated, as Richard Posner claims, by analyzing the contribution that a
particular judge's decisions have had on the formulation and development of the
law on any given subject.' I accept this standard as axiomatic in this determi-
nation. Based on this standard, it is difficult to see how anyone could claim that
Learned Hand was a great trademark judge.
Learned Hand's trademark jurisprudence, taken as a distinct unit, exhibits a
rather amazing conservativism. Hand's judicial philosophy in trademark cases
was to give extreme deference to the common law as he learned it in the 1920s.
He was extremely resistant to change. This is perhaps explained by what appears
to be Hand's understanding of legal positivism-that law is a statement of the
will of the sovereign and judges are not free to create law without a clear
statement of authority from the State. This judicial philosophy by Hand actually
had an extremely restrictive" impact on the development of trademark law.
Although Hand is given much credit for shaping the law in this area,'2 sub-
stantially all of his discourse on the subject has a remarkably conservative tone.
This conservativism seems to be informed by the legal positivists' notion of law
and the role of lawyers.
Because trademark law was in such a formative stage of development while
Hand was judging these cases, and because trademark law has historically been
a right derived at common law, 13 he actually had a negative impact on the expan-
sion of rights granted to holders 14 of trademarks. In fact, Hand spent thirty years
attempting to discredit the one case for which he is most often cited and on which
much of his trademark jurisprudence fame is based. 5
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-77 (1958) [hereinafter HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS].
Hand has, of coirse, been vastly influential in other areas of the law. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (creating the "Hand formula" for determining negligence);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.1945) (representing one of the most relied upon
antitrust cases).
10. See Posner, Book Review, supra note 5, at 523.
11. I intend to use this word in an objective, neutral sense. I do not mean that it is necessarily negative
or positive that Hand was restrictive of trademark rights. Whether trademark rights normatively should be as
constrained as Hand wanted is beyond the scope of this article.
12. See Louis H. Pollak, In Praise of Friendly, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 39,39 (1984) (stating that Hand had
a "[d]ecisive influence on the development of American law"); John T. Noonan, Jr., Choice of a Profession,
21 PEPP. L. REv. 381, 382 (1994) (noting that, for Hand, "law was a craft"); see also Frank M. Coffin,
Reclaiming A Great Judge's Legacy, 46 ME. L. REv. 377 (1994) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)).
13. See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News
Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHm. L. REV. 411,418 (1983).
14. I refer to these entities as "holders" rather than "owners," because I think it is wrong to use property
rhetoric to describe so-called "owners" of intellectual "property." See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of
Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REv. 519, 552-68 (1993).
15. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928). See infra notes 160-70 and
accompanying text.
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This article, then, is a systematic study of all twenty-five opinions (either
majority or dissenting)16 regarding substantive trademark law that Learned Hand
wrote while on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.17 Part II introduces the law
of trademarks.' 8 Part I introduces legal positivism, which I believe strongly
influenced Hand's perspective on the role of a judge in our system of justice.'9
Part IV describes Hand's peculiar interest and attraction to intellectual property
opinions in general. Part V consists of a systematic analysis of Hand's
trademark cases.2
The article concludes that Hand was a rather rigid legal positivist and that this
philosophical perspective strongly influenced the manner in which Hand viewed
his role as a judge in trademark cases, thereby dictating and explaining the
outcomes of his trademark cases. Furthermore, Hand's legal positivist perspective
explains the difference between his opinions and various otherwise irreconcilable
cases by other courts-including the Supreme Court-and resulted in greatly
restricting the development of trademark law.
Finally, this article concludes that Hand's superlative reputation in the area
of substantive trademark law is not only unearned, but is based on complete myth.
Very few Learned Hand trademark decisions should be cited today as controlling
16. All 25 cases are as follows: Artypq, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1956); American Chicle
Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum Inc., 208 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1953); American Auto Ass'n v. Spiegel, 205 F.2d 771
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); Federal Telivision Corp. & Radio Corp. v. Federal TV, 180
F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1950); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949); G.H. Mumm Champagne v. Easter Wine Corp. 142 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
715 (1944); Adolph Kastor & Bros. v. F.T.C., 138 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1943); Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v.
J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943); Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White
House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1943); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Alltex Prod. Corp., 117
F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 631 (1941); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427 (2d
Cir. 1940); Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 616 (1939); Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corp., 85 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1936);
American Medicinal Spirits Co. v. United Distillers, Ltd., 76 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1935); L.E, Waterman Co. v.
Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934); My-T Fine Corp. v. Samuels, 69 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1934); Mulhens &
Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muelhens, Inc., 43 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 881 (1930); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728
(1930); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928); Oakland Chem. Co. v. Bookman, 22 F.2d
930 (2d Cir. 1927); Caron Corp. v. Vivaudou, Inc., 4 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1925); Shredded Wheat Co. v.
Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 412
(2d Cir. 1917) (Hand, J., concurring), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn &
Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
17. Hand sat on the Second Circuit often even while he was still a member of the district court. He
apparently made a name for himself in that capacity and this is what distinguished him in the minds of his
would-be peers on the Second Circuit. See GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 270. To limit the volume of material,
I have chosen to review and comment systematically on those opinions written while Hand sat in the capacity
of an appellatejudge. I am confident, however, that the conclusions in this article can also be applied to Hand's
opinions while sitting as a district judge.
18. See infra notes 26-53 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 84-239 and accompanying text.
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law. This is not a great legacy for "the greatest judge in the history of the federal
courts of appeals." 22
By analyzing Hand's trademark opinions and categorizing him as a legal
positivist, it is hoped that more discussion and close scrutiny of Hand's opinions
will be initiated. In this effort, it is important to note, the role of legal theory is to
allow for such group structuring.23 Deliberate group structuring facilitates the
understanding of specific bodies of information. Most importantly, my use of
theory in this article is intended to be causal, not just descriptive.24 When theory
is used causally as well as descriptively, one comes to understand and appreciate
the constraints and the perspective under which specific jurists operated.2
H. TRADEMARK LAW GENERALLY
26
Trademark jurisprudence, although well established today, has a rather
peculiar origin and has developed over considerable time. The cause of action, as
initially conceived, was grounded in the common law tort of deceit.27 As such,
only consumers-those who were deceived-had standing to bring suit.28 It was
not until 1905 that trademark law was codified in this country.2 9
The first use of a mark to identify the source of a product actually began at
least 3500 years ago when potters made scratchings on the bottom of their
22. Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1993).
23. SAMUEL SHUMAN, LEGAL POSITIVISM: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 35 (1963).
24. See id. (arguing that theory should be used only descriptively and not causally). Causal use of
theory implies that outcomes can be determined and predicted based on a specific conceptual approach to
jurisprudence. Descriptive use of theory implies that outcomes of specific cases can be grouped and described
after the fact, but not predicted.
25. Occassionally, what seems at first to have little practical relevance can, by creating new perspectives
to conceptualize methodologies, play a significant role in understanding judicial trends. See, e.g., William H.
Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY LJ. 1 (1995); Michael Wells, Positivism
and Antipositivism in Federal Courts Law, 29 GA. L. REV. 655 (1995).
26. See generally RUDOLPH CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES (Louis Altman ed., 3d ed. 1981); JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
(1991); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (3d ed. 1995); Port,
supra note 14.
27. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1989); see also Kenneth R.
Pierce, The Trademark Law Revision Act: Origins of the Use Requirement and an Overview of the New Federal
Trademark Law, 64 FLA. BUS. J. 35 (May 1990). See generally Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403 (1916) and McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877) (discussing the beginnings of trademark law in the
United States); McCARTHY. supra note 26, § 5.02 (citing Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, 49 Eng. Rep. 749
(1842), and discussing the origins of trademark law).
28. Pierce, supra note 27, at 37.
29. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. This Act allowed registration of marks used in
interstate commerce for a period of 20 years with an unlimited right of renewal. Registration constituted prima
facie evidence of ownership of the mark, accorded the owner access to federal courts, and provided certain
remedies for infringement However, the deficiencies in the Act, which were not satisfied despite numerous
amendments, led to its repeal in 1947 by the Lanham Act.
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creations to identify the source.30 The first judicial recognition of trademarks did
not come, however, until 1618 in Southern v. HoWt when an English common
pleas judge made an obscure reference to a mark used on cloth? 2 There are
various renditions of how the subject of trademarks arose in Southern v. How
because the reference is actually to a prior unreported case that denied trademark
rights.33 The notion of protecting a commercially viable indication of source,
therefore, had a rather murky beginning,34 but it soon became a well accepted
judicial notion in England that a mark deserved protection at common law when
it indicated the source or origin of goods.35
The United States Supreme Court stated in 1879 that trademarks do not
"depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires
no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. [Trademarks are]
simply founded on priority of appropriation."
36
In 1905, Congress enacted the Act of 1905 which attempted to create a
national trademark registration system. However, as a "slovenly piece of
legislation, characterized by awkward phraseology, bad grammar and involved
sentences [whose] draftsman had a talent for obscurity amounting to genius,
'" 7
the Act was not well received. In fact, the Act was closely circumscribed by
30. See generally EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WLLTRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 34-39 (1919)
(discussing the history of the trademark); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59
TDEARtKREP. 551 (1969); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADENARK REP. 127 (1955);
Abraham S. Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 876
(1951); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910);
GILSON, supra note 26, § 1.021]; WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 1-14
(1885) (tracing the use of trademarks back several millennia to China, India, Persia, Egypt, Rome, and Greece,
and citing marks used during the time of the Old Testament); id. at 8 (stating that the blocks of stone used to
build the temple of Solomon bore quarry marks so the "mechanics" could "prov[e] their claims to wages"); id.
at 10 (stating that Abraham paid for the cave in which he buried Sarah with coins bearing a mark of
authentication).
31. 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1618).
32. Id. at 1244.
33. See generally FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADEMARKS (1925); Pierce, supra note 27, at 35.
34. See Blanchard v. Hill, 26 Eng. Rep. 692, 694 (1742) (refusing to grant an injunction against an
alleged infringer because the injunction would give the plaintiff a monopoly in sales of the relevant
product-playing cards).
35. See, e.g., Sykes v. Sykes, 107 Eng. Rep. 834, 835 (1824). The court regarded trademark protection
as well established and awarded an injunction to the plaintiff in a situation where the defendant had used the
plaintiff's mark, "SYKES PATENT," on inferior shot-belts and powder flasks and passed them off as products
of the plaintiff. Another case still relied on by many courts is Millington v. Fox, 40 Eng. Rep. 956 (1838),
where the plaintiff sued in equity to enjoin the use of his mark. The court, in awarding the injunction, stated
that the plaintiff had a right to enforce title to its mark and that an injunction was appropriate even though there
was no direct proof of defendant's intent to defraud and that defendant may not have even known of plaintiff's
mark. Id at 960-61. The United States Supreme Court has adopted this case as controlling. Saxlchner v. Siegel-
Cooper Co., 179 U.S. 42,43 (1900).
36. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,94 (1879).
37. Edward S. Rogers, The Expensive Futility of the United States Trade-Mark Statute, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 660,665 (1914).
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courts that determined it granted no substantive trademark rights whatsoever and
amounted to nothing more than a registration statute and a codification of existing
common law. 8
By 1917, the year of Hand's first trademark case, trademark protection was
based exclusively on the common law which, at the time, was based on the
principles of property.39 Therefore, trademarks were protected from being copied
only if they were used by the holder of the mark and only to the extent they were
used. At the time, one could copy a mark as well as a product "slavishly," but if
there was no diversion of trade or no intent to divert trade, there was no action in
trademark law.
Furthermore, when Hand first entered the trademark field in 1917, none of
the concepts of trade dress, dilution, or likelihood of confusion existed. As the
Supreme Court stated in 1879, it was merely an issue of who adopted and used
the mark first.'
Today, as well as when Hand was first called upon to adjudicate trademark
cases, a trademark is protectable only if it is inherently distinctive' or has
attained secondary meaning.42 Secondary meaning today refers to the notion that
descriptive trademarks (which are not protectable) may attain a dual function.43
One function is to operate as the word was originally intended: in a descriptive
sense. The other is to operate as a source-indicating entity. Therefore, secondary
meaning refers to a mark that once may have been descriptive but, through use,
has come to identify a single source for a good or service in the minds of the
relevant purchasing public."4
Under the Lanham Act,45 trademarks are defined as any "word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof... used ... to indicate the source
38, See, e.g., American Trading Co. v. H.E. Heacock Co., 285 U.S. 247,258-59 (1932) (giving priority
over subsequent trademark registration in the Philippines because Congress had express authority to create
trademark rights in the Philippines but not in the United States); American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269
U.S. 372 (1926); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 99 (1918) (recognizing that
"registration of the [petitioner's] trademark under... the act of Congress [did not have] the effect of enlarging
the rights of [petitioner] beyond what they would be under common-law principles"). But cf Philco Corp. v.
Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1943) (finding that Congress had the authority to create
substantive trademark rights and did so in the Act of 1905).
39. Port, supra note 14, at 562-67.
40. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
41. McCARTHY, supra note 26, § 11.02.
42. Id. § 11.09.
43. Id.
44. Gear, Inc. v. LA. Gear California, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 508,515 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The court in LA.
Gear identified the following factors that contribute to the analysis of whether or not a specific mark has
attained secondary meaning: (1) attempts to imitate the mark, (2) advertising expenditures, (3) sales success,
(4) consumer studies linking the mark to a source, (5) unsolicited media coverage of the product and the mark,
and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark's use. Id.
45. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1976 &Supp. 1995).
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of the goods... "46 Trademark protection has been drastically expanded over
what it was in the early 1900s. 47 Trademark protection extends to trade dress even
if the dress has no secondary meaning (provided that it is inherently distinctive),48
extends to protect a mark from dilution in some states4 9 and even extends to
protect the color of the product5 In keeping with this perspective, effective
January 16, 1996, the Lanham Act was amended to allow holders of famous
trademarks to enjoin alleged dilution of their marksO
Trade dress is defined as the overall visual impression of a product or
provision of services.52 Most recently, the Supreme Court has found even the
inside of a Mexican restaurant to be inherently distinctive and the appropriate
subject of rather strong trademark protection! 3
46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1988). See also Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 945
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Design Look Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
47. Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute
Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433,437-47 (1994).
48. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757-58 (1992). This is a rather new
development and constitutes a drastic expansion of the common law of trademarks. For a review of the
common law as it applied to trade dress prior to Taco Cabana, see Port, supra note 47, at 483-84 nn.257-58.
49. Twenty-five states now have trademark dilution statutes. ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993): ARK. CODE
ANN. § 14-71-113 (Michie 1991); CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 35-1li(c) (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West
1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765,
para. 1035115 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51-223.1
(West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I OB, § 12
(1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1995); NED. REV.
STAT. § 87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1995);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §
1124 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); Tax. Bus. &
COM. CODEANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West Supp. 1996).Three
states are considered to be common law dilution jurisdictions: Michigan, New Jersey and Ohio. See Koffler
Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697,704 (E.D. Mich. 1976); OM Scott & Sons Co. v.
Surowitz et al., 209 F. Supp. 59, 61 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Central Transp., Inc.,
201 U.S.P.Q. 524,530 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Chanel, Inc. v. Casa Flora Co.. 241 A.2d 24,27 (N.J. 1968), cert.
denied, 242 A.2d 381 (1968). But cf. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A & P Trucking Corp., 149 A.2d 595, 599
(N.J. 1959) (issuing an injunction even though there was no competition; however, the court required and
found a reasonable likelihood of confusion). Therefore, it is also quite unlikely that a plaintiff would prevail
under New Jersey Common Law in a pure dilution cause of action. See Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace,
490 F. Supp. 818, 828 (D.NJ. 1980). Ohio also appears to recognize a common law cause of action for
dilution. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960,965 (6th Cir. 1987).
50. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1308 (1995).
51. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 104 Stat. 985; see id. (amending 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125).
52. See Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609,613 (9th Cir. 1989); Roulo v. Russ Berrie
& Co., 886 F.2d 931,935 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990). Courts have traditionally held
that labels, packages, and product designs may all constitute trade dress. See, e.g., Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc.,
812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986); Freixenet S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 153 (3d
Cir. 1984); T.G.I. Friday's Inc. v. Int'l Restaurant Group, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 698,708 (M.D. La. 1975), affd,
569 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1978).
53. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
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]I. HAND'S LEGAL POSITIVISM
Legal positivism has a variety of forms and meanings. For purposes of this
article, I shall define what I believe Learned Hand understood as legal positivism
and then demonstrate how this legal theory informed and directed Hand's judicial
theory.
At its core, legal positivism is the notion that all law is the product of the will
of the state' and that law is divorced from morals.55 In other words, a legal
positivist is mostly concerned with what the law is in order to determine the will
of the state.56 The legal positivist is not concerned with whether the moral
propositions upon which the laws are based are normatively true or false.
5 7
Legal positivism began as an English philosophical response to the natural
law proponents and was the first modern attempt at a coherent theory of law.58 In
response to natural law proponents such as John Locke, John Austin, a disciple
of Jeremy Bentham,59 proposed a detailed theory of the law of a nation-state. Both
Bentham and Austin-generally considered the founders of legal positi-
vism -- were concerned that if the natural law proponents' concepts were put
54. See KEEKOK LEE, THE POSITIVIST SCIENCE OF LAW 2 (1989); Roberto Ago, Positive Law and
International Law, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 691,700 (1957). For the proposition that only positive law is the true
set of obligations that are entitled to be called "law"--another view espoused by most legal positivists-see
P. SOPER, A THEORY OFLAW 102 (1984).
55. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-207 (1961); JoHN M. LIGHTWOOD, THE NATURE OF
POSITIVE LAW 362-90 (1982); SHUMAN, supra note 23, at 15.
56. See RAYMOND FRANCIS BEGIN, NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW 94-138 (1959).
57. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 818 (1990).
58. See R.W.M. DIAs, JURISPRUDENcE451 (4th ed. 1976).
59. It is not widely known but extremely provocative that not only were Bentham, Austin and John
Stewart Mill contemporaries, they were also close neighbors in Queen Square, London, in the early Nineteenth
Century. See DIAS, supra note 58, at 460.
60. LIGHTwoOD, supra note 55, at 1. Other major theorists in this field include JALES L. COLEMAN,
MARKETS MORALS AND THE LAW 3-27 (1988); JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1970);
SHUMAN, supra note 23; SOPER, supra note 54; Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J.
INT'L L. 691 (1957); Robert Ago, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 MONIST 295 (1985); Hans Kelson, The Pure
Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 474 (1934); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989).
Although all of these theorists can appropriately be labeled "legal positivists," it is endemic to the nature of
legal positivism that they do not necessarily agree with one another's perceptions of the subject matter. The
most vigorous debate in this regard has arisen between H.L.A. Hart (and his supporters) and Ronald Dworkin
(and his supporters). Hart and Dworkin have a long history of doing battle over what legal positivism is or is
not. Compare HART, supra note 55 with RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1977);
compare H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982) and
H.L.A. Hart, Comment in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (R. Gavison ed., 1987) with RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986). Some of the more helpful overviews of this dispute include FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN
LAW AND IN LIFE 199 (1991); Kenneth Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights
Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REV. 369, 371 (1984); E. Philip Soper,
Legal Theory and the Obligation of the Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977). Some
purport to have resolved the conflicts between legal positive theorists. See, e.g., W. J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE
LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994).
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into effect, chaos would result. Therefore, both Bentham and Austin clearly
delineated that what the law is was distinct from what the law ought to be.'
Whereas natural rights theorists purported that only those laws that conformed to
morality were binding,62 legal positivists held that laws, as an expression of the
will of the state, were binding whether or not they comported with morality.63
This is the form of legal positivism that Hand espoused in virtually all of his
writings.64 As a moral skeptic,65 Hand clearly subscribed to the notion that one's
morality should be kept distinct from how one judges and applies the law. In
various instances, Hand wrote that "man, and man alone creates the universe of
good and evil;" 66 that values "admit to no reduction below themselves; you may
prefer Dante to Shakespeare, or claret to champagne, but that ends it;" 67and "[w]e
see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on
as before."6 Most telling, Hand explained his understanding of his role as a judge
as follows: It is not "desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating
opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but
whose birth is distant."69
Hand's understanding of his role as a judge was to "obey clear commands"
of his superiors and bow to precedent, but to continue to express criticism of the
prevailing law. 70 This manner of thought process seems consistent with a judicial
theory that is heavily imbued with legal positivism.
Hand's adherence to moral skepticism as derived from legal positivism gave
him a jurisprudential justification to harshly confine the expansion of trademark
61. HART, supra note 55, at 206.
62. CHARLES COVELL, THE DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 7 (1992); HART, supra note 55, at 182; JOHN
LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE 97 (1990).
63. HART, supra note 55, at 181.
64. This is especially true in The Bill of Rights, in which Hand advocated the position that only legis-
lative acts that were totally unreasonable should be reviewed by the judiciary and that most constitutional
issues should be nonjusticiable because the Constitution does not expressly state that federal judges have the
power of judicial review. See HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 73-77.
65. See Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 1061, 1066. As a moral skeptic, Hand had
"additional motive" to be a legal positivist. Id. at 1066 n.10.
66. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRTOFLiBERTY 93 (1959).
67. Id. at 198.
68. HAND, BILLOFrRIGTS, supra note 9, at 19 (citing Johnson v. United States. 163 F. 30.32 (1st Cir.
1908) (Holmes, J.)). Hand was an avid supporter and disciple of Holmes. Because Holmes was such a clear
legal positivist and because Hand was so fond of Holmes, it is understandable how Hand became a moral
skeptic and legal positivist himself. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the common law must be "the articulate voice of some sovereign ... that can be
identified"); see also GRANT GnMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1978); O.W. HOLiES, THE COMMON
LAW (M. Howe ed., 1963).
69. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., dissenting),
vacated sub nom., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
70. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 149.
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rights-rights that were based on common law and therefore very susceptible to
the judicial philosophy of a particular judge.71
IV. HAND AND TRADEMARKS
Billings Learned Hand was born in Albany, New York in 1872.2 Hand was
the son of an Albany lawyer in a family of lawyers.73 However, Hand's first love
was not the law. In fact, Hand was not exactly a resounding success as a
practicing lawyer.74 In his early days at the bar, Hand worked in several different
firms and never made a real impression on any of his employers as a star
practitioner."
Hand actually wanted to study, learn, and then teach philosophy, 76his original
motivating intellectual inquiry. In fact, Hand clearly would have pursued a career
in philosophy if he had possessed the personal strength and confidence to oppose
his father's visions for him.77
Although generally viewed as a pillar of intellectual strength, Hand was
emotionally rather troubled.7' He was forever insecure in his position as a judge;
he never spoke of his role as one of the most famous judges of his time in
anything more than extremely modest asides. At the commemoration of Hand's
fifty years of judicial service, Hand said, "I confess when I look at my service it
seems to have been for the most part trivial. It amounted to a good deal to the
people at the moment, but when one takes it in bulk, it does not seem to have
been much." 79
Extreme modesty or extreme insecurity seem to be the best explanations for
this apparent low self-image. This seems rather harsh self-criticism for one of the
"greatest jurists to have ever lived.' 'W However, rather than merely an expression
of Hand's self-doubt, these modest expressions are more indicative of Hand's true
love-philosophy. Hand was extremely philosophical about his role as a judge
and his role in life in general.8 '
Trademark cases were particularly well suited for Hand's philosophical
excursions. As much as anything else, Hand's personal affinity toward
71. For the argument that the political affiliation of individual judges does not affect the substantive
outcome of their assigned cases today, see Orley Ashenfelter et a]., Politics and The Judiciary: The Influence
of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995).
72. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 59-61.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 33,40.
77. Id. at 42, 54.
78. Id. at 4.
79. Fifty Years of Federal Judicial Service, 264 F.2d 5, 27 (2d Cir. 1959).
80. See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
81. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 42.
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philosophy attracted him to intellectual property law cases. 2 Because he
approached the trademark law cases based on his interest in philosophy, it is not
surprising that a particular school of philosophy-legal positivism-greatly
affected not only the manner in which Hand approached his job but also the actual
outcome of his cases. In Hand's trademark cases, his judicial philosophy was
clearly affected by his philosophical interests. Rather than expand the law of
trademarks-an achievement for which Hand is generally given credit-without
a clear "positive policy" 3 dictating in clear terms that a plaintiff possessed some
right, Hand was extremely reticent to create one.
V. HAND'S TRADEMARK OPINIONS
Learned Hand's trademark opinions can all be categorized as addressing three
rather narrow issues. It is surprising that after all the credit given to Hand for
influencing the field, all of his twenty-five opinions actually address so few
trademark issues. The three areas Hand addressed were trade dress, the unrelated
goods doctrine,s4 and the so-called Hand Doctrine.
Trade dress refers to protection for the shape, style, or design of packaging
or overall business image. The unrelated goods doctrine generally holds that
infringement may still be found even if the goods of the defendant and the goods
of the plaintiff are not identical, providing that the goods of the defendant are
similar enough that consumers might come to believe they emanate from the
plaintiff. As we shall see, the Hand Doctrine referred first to the expanded version
of the unrelated goods doctrine, but soon came to mean that Hand would sustain
an infringement cause of action only if there was actual confusion or intention to
misdirect consumers.
In each of Hand's trademark opinions, his clear struggle with separating what
he believed the outcome ought to be from what he saw as the confining precedent
at the time is obvious. Even in the rare instance when the "ought" prevailed, Hand
carefully circumscribed the expansion of new trademark rights.8 5 Hand became
famous in trademark discourse86 for these expansive cases even though they
82. Id. at 328.
83. Oakland Chem. Co. v. Bookman, 22 F.2d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1927).
84. This is also known as the "Aunt Jemima Doctrine," so named because of the Second Circuit's
decision in Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Gigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917). See infra notes 148-79 and
accompanying text (discussing the Aunt Jemima Doctrine).
85. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
86. See General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 226 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Mich. 1964);
see also Miles J. Alexander, Dilution-A Blessing or a Curse?: What is it? How Do You Prove it? How Does
it Fit in with Traditional Trademark Law?, 251 PL/PAT 297 (1988) (relying on Hand's "powerful prose" in
the Yale Electric opinion for substantive trademark law); Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False
Advertising Under 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1992);
Robert Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 164 n.25 (recognizing both Hand's expansion and
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represent a small fraction of his trademark opinions and even though Hand
subsequently spent the rest of his life confining their application. Virtually all of
Hand's trademark opinions are extremely restrictive of a trademark holder's
rights because he felt confined by what he considered to be the "Law and the
Prophets" on the subject in 1928-that "one merchant shall not divert customers
from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the second;
' 7
Hand was extremely resistant to change.
A. Trade Dress Opinions
Hand's resistance to change can be seen as early as his first trademark
opinion in 1917.88 In Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 89 in a one page
opinion, Hand held that even though the plaintiff's adjustable wrench was new
in shape and very pleasing to the public, and even though there was actual
confusion in the minds of the purchasing public, the shape of the wrench was
functional because it had not attained a secondary meaning.0
Although Hand cites only one case in the entire opinion,9' he claims that the
cases all stand for the proposition that the second comer's article must be an
"exact" copy and that the second comer must have intended the deception before
the plaintiff can prevail.92 Hand further stated that the final question is always
whether the public actually was "moved in any degree to buy the article because
of its source and what are the features by which it distinguishes that source. ' 93
retraction of trademark rights); Mary H. Reed, Trademarks in the Sale of Part of a Business. Concurrent Use
and Licensing, 361 PLI/PAT 113 n.10 (1993) (citing Hand specifically as being responsible for the Yale
Electric ruling); Timothy R.M. Bryant, Comment, Trademark Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence of
Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 473,482 (1988) (referring to Hand's ruling in Yale Electric
as a "principle canon of trademark law"); Mary A. Rinney, Note, Levi Strauss and Co. v. Blue Bell Inc.:
Limiting the Protection ofInherently Nondistinctive Trademarks, 36 DEPAUL L. REv. 159,164 (1986) (citing
Hand for his rejection of the restrictive wording of the 1905 Trademark Act in his Yale Electric opinion
expanding protection to include related, yet noncompeting goods).
87. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972,973 (2d Cir. 1928).
88. GUmER, supra note 4, at 270; see id. (noting that although Hand was still a district court judge,
he was often asked to sit with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals).
89. 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
90. Id. at301.
91. See Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, 131 F. 240 (2d Cir. 1904) (upholding in a one-page opinion
an injunction against the defendant who had copied the plaintiff's mills whenever it was convenient and
profitable so that the resultant mill manufactured by the defendant looked exactly like the plaintiffs mill).
92. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilbom & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917); see id. ("The plaintiff
has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his wares which in fact are
not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the other hand, may
copy the plaintiff's goods slavishly down to the minutest detail; but he may not represent himself as the
plaintiff in their sale"). Even at this early stage, Hand was taking rather remarkable liberties with precedent.
For example, Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, actually holds that "proof [of consumer deception] is hardly
needed." 131 F. at 241.
93. Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 299.
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Hand, however, does not sound as though he had convinced himself, let alone
the reader. In the last paragraph of the opinion, Hand essentially confined his own
opinion to the exact facts presented and thereby limited its precedential value.
Hand stated that this case did not address the limits of the plaintiff's rights-only
that purchasers must be motivated to buy the goods because of the shape of the
product before that shape can be protected.
As with many of Hand's opinions, Crescent Tool seems to have attained a life
of its own merely because Learned Hand wrote the opinion, not because the
opinion itself was particularly enlightening. In fact, it has been difficult to find
any other single Hand opinion that has been as misquoted and misconstrued as
Crescent Tool. One set of commentators even relied on Crescent Tool in 1993 as
"still apropos"' for the proposition that secondary meaning is absolutely required
before any trade dress can be protected. This resulted even though in 1992 the
United States Supreme Court, in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.," noted
that the Second Circuit's requirement for secondary meaning in all trade dress
cases was overly restrictive.
96
Crescent Tool quickly became representative of a new theory of trade dress
cases known as "source motivation. 97 That is, Crescent Tool stood for Hand's
notion that the trade dress must distinguish a product as coming from a particular
source and that the consumer was motivated to buy it because of that source?'
Both elements of Hand's test as articulated in Crescent Tool have been
completely repudiated. It is now axiomatic that the first element of Hand's test
is inappropriate. That is, no court requires that the purchaser know "the" source
of a product. It is perfectly adequate that the purchaser know that the product
comes from "a" source even if that source is anonymous. 99 Additionally, in 1984,
Congress passed the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984.'0 One of its principal
purposes was to clarify that "purchaser motivation" should not be used in
determining the validity of trademarks. The legislative history is clear: "[T]he
'purchaser motivation' test exceeds the bounds of merely an impropriety test;
rather, it shows a disregard for the basic purposes of trademark protection. '0 '
94. Lawrence E. Evans, Jr. & Elizabeth A. Hoover, Protection of Product Configurations Under the
Lanham Act, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 126, 139 (1993).
95. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
96. Id. at 2764 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. See A. Samuel Oddi, Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law: Ott the
Importance of Source, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1. 27 n.1 17 (1986).
98. Id. at 28.
99. Id. at 75.
100. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1064(3) (West 1993)).
101. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 5726.
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Even the Second Circuit has repudiated the source motivation theory in trade
dress cases. In Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Tools, Inc., 102 the court rejected the
source motivation theory from Crescent Tool as well as all the subsequent cases
that depended upon it.'03
Therefore, the general theory of Crescent Tool has been expressly rejected by
the Supreme Court, one element has been expressly rejected by the United States
Congress, and the final element has been expressly repudiated by the Second
Circuit itself. This makes statements that the case is "still apropos" even more
difficult to understand. Of course, it also makes canonization of the judge that
wrote the opinion rather suspect, as well.
Crescent Tool's legacy went even further than this. In Crescent Tool, Hand
held that in order to prevail on a trade dress type claim, the plaintiff must show
that the design was nonfunctional. According to Hand, nonfunctionality is proven
by the existence of secondary meaning. Furthermore, Hand concluded that
secondary meaning is established when the plaintiff shows that purchasers knew
the product emanated from the plaintiff and that they bought the product because
it emanated from the plaintiff. That is, according to the actual language in
Crescent Tool, Hand believed that the functionality of a trade dress was
intertwined with whether the mark had secondary meaning. According to the
exact language in Crescent Tool, if the mark had secondary meaning, it was not
functional and therefore protectable.
Once again, however, this Hand opinion has taken on a life of its own. A
surprising number of courts have relied on Crescent Tool for the proposition that
trade dress requires a bifurcated analysis even though the language of Crescent
Tool simply does not say that.'4 Today, in order to prevail, a plaintiff must show
102. 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. See Oddi, supra note 97, at 30.
104. See, e.g., Ives Laboratories, Inc., v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
Crescent Tool for the proposition that "[ilmitation of the physical details and designs of a competitor's product
may be actionable, if the particular features imitated are 'nonfunctional' and have acquired a secondary
meaning"); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (referring
to the Crescent Tool passage discussing "nonfunctional" imitation of a competitor-product's features);
Wembley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co., 216 F. Supp. 565, 587 (D. Md. 1963) (finding that even where the fabric
label was held to be a non-functional feature, one may copy such a feature unless it has acquired a secondary
meaning); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (quoting the
passage from Crescent Tool where Hand claims that nonfunctionality is defined by whether or not the mark
has secondary meaning and relying on that quotation for the now dated proposition that first a court must find
confusion and then grant relief only if the copied item is nonfunctional); Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119,
123 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (stating the same proposition). Some courts have come closer to what Hand was saying
in Crescent Tool but still seem to overstate Hand's language. See, e.g., Kingsway, Inc. v. Ray Werner, 233 F.
Supp 102, 104 (E.D. Mo. 1964) ("A person could legally copy a nonfunctional part of an article unless the
originator proved two things: First, that a certain feature of the originator's product had acquired a 'secondary
meaning,' thereupon identifying the source of the product to prospective buyers; second, that buyers are likely
to confuse the imitation with the original"). Although the law today does require a bifurcated analysis-first
determining whether the trade dress is inherently distinctive or has secondary meaning and second, if the mark
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that the trade dress has secondary meaning'0 5 (or is inherently distinctive) and that
the trade dress is not functional.' °6 Although this is now the "Law and the
Prophets" on this subject according to the Supreme Court,'07 the concept did not
come from Hand in Crescent Tool and any such reliance is misplaced.
Crescent Tool is actually most significant because it marks the beginning of
Hand's restrictive view of trademark rights. Although often given credit for
developing the law of intellectual property, in trademark jurisprudence, from his
very first trademark opinion while on the Second Circuit, Hand became a
formidable obstacle to the expansion of trademark rights in the United States.'
The next trademark opinion by Hand was also a trade dress case. In Shredded
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co.,t' 9 Hand found that the shape of the
shredded wheat biscuit was protectable trade dress and enjoined the defendant
from copying the biscuit's shape without marking it in some manner to identify
it as separate from the plaintiff's product. In Hand's terms, the level of secondary
meaning required was "the long monopoly of the plaintiff.""o
Although the outcome is different than Crescent Tool, Hand's reasoning was
the same. In fact, Shredded Wheat is an example of a case where Hand was able
to apply his source motivation theory to a specific case in which the plaintiff
prevailed."' According to Hand's source motivation theory, the plaintiff will
prevail only if it can show that the trade dress had secondary meaning and
secondary meaning is determined by the motivation of the purchaser. In Shredded
Wheat, Hand defined secondary meaning as a near monopoly on the design
recognized by nearly everyone in the industry as emanating from the plaintiff.
is functional-it did not come from the actual language of Crescent Tool.
105. Secondary meaning is shown when the trade dress signifies a single source in the minds of the
relevant purchaser. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Bonito Boats v.
Thundercraft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
106. A trade dress can be functional, and therefore not deserving of protection, in two ways:
mechanically functional or aesthetically functional. Mechanical functionality exits when the design gives the
manufacturer a competitive advantage, the design provides a cheap pricing advantage, alternatives are not
available, or the feature consists of the product itself. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that a spray bottle design is registrable); In re Weber-Stephen Prods. Co,, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d 1659 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (holding that a grill design is registrable); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v.
Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a metal roofing system design is not
registrable). A trade dress is aesthetically functional and therefore not protectable when the aspect is significant
to the product, others need the aspect in order to compete, or a company is granted a perpetual monopoly on
an unpatented aspect of the product via such recognition. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, 653 F.2d 822
(3d Cir. 1981); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); see also JANE GINSBURG ET AL.,
TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPEM-nON LAW (199 1).
107. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
108. Even though Crescent Tool should be read as a restriction on the expansion of trademark rights,
Hand further confined its application in his last trademark opinion. See American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman,
275 F.2d 287, 289 n.2 (2d Cir. 1960).
109. 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918).
110. Id. at 963.
111. See Oddi, supra note 97, at 28.
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This is still extremely restrictive rhetoric. Very few trade dresses possess this
level of secondary meaning.'
12
Shredded Wheat has not been well received. This point, of course, has been
lost to those that contribute to the canonization of Hand. Some judges and
commentators revel in pointing out how rarely the Supreme Court overturned a
Hand decision." 3 However, when addressing the same issue Hand faced in
Shredded Wheat-whether the shredded wheat biscuit was protectable trade
dress-the Supreme Court held that the biscuit was generic and therefore
improper for trademark protection.114 In fact, Justice Brandeis' opinion in Kellogg
Co. v. Nabisco specifically criticizes the plaintiff's attempt to extend the life of
a design patent by resorting to trade dress law-precisely Hand's reasoning on
the subject.
Furthermore, even the Second Circuit overruled this case sub silentio."t 5
Therefore, to argue that a judge's cases were rarely overturned by the Supreme
Court does not necessarily mean that that judge's opinions are all applicable,
relevant, or even good law today.
For example, one of the most restrictive opinions that Hand wrote came less
than a year after Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson-one of his most expansive. In
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,116 Hand refused to recognize what today would
easily be called the plaintiff's trade dress. In Doris Silk, the plaintiff manufactured
silk scarves. The specific patterns it chose came to represent the plaintiff. The
plaintiff argued that the patterns on the silk acted as a trade dress that was owned
by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff, therefore, should be able to enjoin the use
by others of the same designs.
Hand vehemently opposed such a possibility. Because he could find no
positive law mandating that he grant protection to the owner of the silk, Hand
concluded the exact opposite: "In the absence of some recognized right at
common law, or under the statutes-and the plaintiff claims neither-a man's
property is limited to the chattels which embody his invention."" 7 This statement
is one of many clear examples of how legal positivism shaped Hand's judicial
theory, and thereby restricted the development of trademark rights.
In Doris Silk, the plaintiff relied upon INS v. AP."8 In INS, the Supreme
Court held that there was a property right to be free from competition and
dissemination of the news for a limited period of time, and that that right was
infringed if a competitor copied an East-coast news story and broadcast it on the
112. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2761 (1992).
113. See, e.g., WYZANSKI, supra note 2.
114. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
115. See Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Tools, Inc., 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Oddi, supra
note 97, at 31.
116. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
117. Id. at 280.
118. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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West coast before the owner of the original story could do so."t9 The Supreme
Court found that the plaintiff had a property right to be free of unfair competition.
Analogously, the plaintiff in Doris Silk argued that if there was a property right
to be free from unfair competition when assembling and disseminating the news,
then there was certainly a property right to be free of unfair competition when the
defendant copied the patterns of silk that had come to represent the plaintiff. In
fact, Hand, in a memorandum to the other judges on this case, admitted:
I confess that the Associated Press Case is somewhat of a stumbling
block, but I do not believe that the five justices who united in Pitney, J's
opinion meant to lay down a general rule that a man is entitled to
"property" in the form of whatever he makes with his labor and money,
so as to prevent others from copying it. To do so would be to short-
circuit the Patent Office and throw upon courts the winnowing out of all
such designs that might be presented. While I agree that on principle it
is hard to distinguish, and that the language applies, I cannot suppose that
any principle of such far-reaching consequence was intended. It will
make patent cases an exception; it will give to State courts jurisdiction
over inventions; it will overthrow the practice of centuries. 2°
In the memorandum regarding Doris Silk, Hand is clearly obsessed with
protecting the patent laws from being preempted by what has now become known
as trade dress protection. It appears that the language in the first sentence of the
quotation above, regarding labor as a justification for property, is a rather thinly
veiled statement regarding Locke's labor theory as a natural rights justification
for property. Hand's fear of the potentially broad-reaching effects of such a
conclusion is very similar to the fears as expressed by some of the famous legal
positivists in response to natural law philosophy.1
2'
In Doris Silk, however, one does not really get a sense that Hand was at all
troubled by INS, although his private writings clearly show that he was. Rather,
Hand artfully limited INS to its facts and even criticized it. Hand argued that to
understand it otherwise would mean that the Supreme Court intended to create a
common law patent or copyright for the reasons of justice.'22 This, Hand argues,
119. Id. at 239-40.
120. Memorandum from L Hand to Manton and Swan (Oct. 8, 1929) (copy on file with the Pacific Law
Journal). Original Hand Memoranda are located at the Harvard University Law Library.
121. See, e.g., HART, supra note 55, at 206.
122. Not all courts have agreed. In Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 122 N.Y.S.2d 488,489 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1953), the court relied upon INS for the proposition that the law of unfair competition no longer requires
that a plaintiff's business and advertising acquire secondary meaning. Although this was true after Taco
Cabana provided that trade dress is inherently distinctive, it was not true in the Second Circuit at the time.
Rather, Santa's Workshop identifies the worries that Hand and others had of the natural rights justification of
intellectual property if applied expansively.
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"would flagrantly conflict with the scheme which Congress has for more than a
century devised to cover the subject matter."'
Hand was, naturally, correct and not misleading when he stated it would be
unconstitutional for the Supreme Court to legislate. Hand was quite successful in
restricting the application of INS in subsequent cases in the Second Circuit 24 and
by reference in other circuits as well.'
1
However, the fact remains that INS probably should have dictated a different
result in Doris Silk, as Hand recognized. Merely artfully saying that a specific
Supreme Court opinion is limited to its facts begs the question of whether it
dictates a different outcome. And, more importantly, why was it that Hand was
so afraid of applying INS expansively, granting the plaintiff in Doris Silk an
injunction and recognizing a property interest in the silk designs?
Juxtaposing these two cases makes Hand's philosophical orientation even
more obvious. Hand clearly took issue with the natural rights concepts prevalent
in INS.126 To Hand, unless there was some clear "positive policy 127 on the
subject, he could not create new trademark rights no matter what he was morally
inclined to do.
In taking an extreme natural rights perspective in INS, the Supreme Court
potentially greatly expanded the subject matter. To the Supreme Court in INS,
regardless of what the law on the subject was, it was morally wrong to allow AP
to continue to steal INS's news before INS could disseminate it. Therefore, the
Supreme Court used a natural rights theory of intellectual property protection to
justify the grant of the injunction. INS owned the news merely because "they got
123. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279,280 (2d Cir. 1929).
124. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940).
125. Baird, supra note 13, at 411-23.
126. See id. at 420. In restricting the application of INS, Hand is in good company. There has been a glut
of scholarship recently criticizing INS from a variety of perspectives. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178 (1992) (asserting
that the natural rights justification for intellectual property where the misappropriation doctrine as stated in INS
prohibited the defendant from reaping where it has not sown-that there are quasi-property rights in
information-is so poorly reasoned that response is difficult); Baird, supra note 13, at 411 (creating new
common law rights in intellectual property, as INS did, forces judges to assess and confront first
principles-common law judges are not equipped to face first principles; therefore, cases such as INS open the
door to granting irrational rights following a natural rights concept of fairness rather than the economic
incentive theories of intellectual property); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright,
Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. Rav. 1413, 1446-47 (1992) (asserting that the economic
incentives theories justifying copyright protection are wrong, and that the economic theories of INS could
convert the public domain into a fallow landscape of private plots); Pamela Samuelson, Information as
Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38
CATH. U. L. REv. 365, 388-89 (1989) (finding INS worthy of study "because the majority's struggle to
articulate its property theory is impossible to untangle from its unfair competition analysis"). For an extensive
analysis of Hand's treatment of INS, see Paul Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1969).
127. Oakland Chem. Co. v. Bookman, 22 F.2d 930,931 (2d Cir. 1927).
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there first" and because they exerted some effort in getting and disseminating that
news. The right to enjoin AP was created because any other outcome was morally
wrong. That is, morality prevailed in INS. 28
This is the polar extreme of Hand's personal philosophy regarding the role
of a judge. As a legal positivist, Hand believed that one's personal morality
should be kept completely separate of the equation. The judge should look at the
existing law. If the law dictated an injunction, it should be granted; if not, it
would be inexcusable to insert one's arbitrary morality to determine the outcome.
How a judge felt the outcome "should" be had to be kept separate from what the
law dictated.
Therefore, as a legal positivist, Hand felt he was bound to the law as it existed
and stated as an expression of the will of the state. Because he found no remedy
for the plaintiff in Doris Silk, he apparently felt powerless to generate one merely
for the sake of justice. INS may be a rather extreme example of the natural rights
view of intellectual property protection, but Doris Silk is a rather extreme
example of how legal positivism influenced Hand's decision-making process and
the actual outcome of the case.
Doris Silk is an example of the worst-case scenario for Hand as the legal
positivist. Confronted with an opinion from the highest court in the land, which
he was bound by stare decisis to follow, and with which he personally disagreed,
this case represented a real conceptual problem for Hand. Hand resolved the
dilemma by merely concluding that the facts of INS were distinguishable. In
subsequent cases where INS may have dictated a different outcome, Hand cited
himself for the proposition that INS should be construed narrowly and only
applied to identical facts. 29 In fact, following Hand's lead, the entire Second
Circuit appears to have attempted to do its best to circumscribe the application of
INS.130
Contrary to Hand's deepest fears about the results of granting trade dress
protection, extremely expansive protection of trade dress has not made patent
cases an exception, has not given the States jurisdiction over inventions, nor has
it specifically overthrown the practice of centuries. Once again, subsequent
common law regarding trademark jurisprudence has not borne out Hand's
concerns.
A further example of this legal positivism in a Hand trade dress case was My-
TFine Corp. v. Samuels.t31 There Hand found the trade dress of the plaintiff valid
128. See Baird, supra note 13, at 419-20.
129. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86,90 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
(1940).
130. United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028, 1036 (3d Cir. 1984); G. Ricordi &
Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952); Millinery Creators' Guild, Inc. v. FrC, 109 F.2d 175 (2d
Cir. 1940), afftd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
131. 69 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1934).
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and infringed when the defendant intentionally copied the plaintiff's dress. When
the defendant "had not the slightest original interest in the [trade dress] chosen
and their distribution, [defendant] could only have meant to cause confusion, out
of which they might profit by diverting the plaintiff's customers.' 13 2 That is, once
again Hand rigidly adhered to what he referred to as "the Law and the Prophets"
on the subject 13 -unless trade is actually diverted or the defendant clearly intends
such a diversion, no injunction will issue.
This is further evidenced by Hand's trade dress opinion in American Chicle
Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum.134 There, even though there was evidence of some
actual confusion, Hand said that confusion alone did not justify the injunction.
Rather, the "patent effort to catch [careless] buyers' ' 135 justified the injunction.
And, of course, the converse seems to be implied: unless the plaintiff can show
such a patent effort, the injunction is unlikely to issue.
This is supported by Hand's memorandum to the other judges sitting on the
American Chicle case. In the memorandum, Hand admits that "[i]t is quite true
that I am fishing in a pool of mere probability; but why not, in cases like this? I
would go far to protect a defendant in his use of any make-up that had importance
to him of [sic] itself; but that is not this case.., is there really any sound reason
for letting this defendant poach along the border of the plaintiffs mark?'
'136
In his opinion, Hand articulates his perspective on trademark infringement
quite clearly. Hand examines the fact that the Lanham Act requires only a
"likelihood of confusion" to support a finding of infringement.137 However, Hand
rejects the statute as being restrictive and not to be read "tabula rasa"'38 and
claims to "construe [the Lanham Act] in the background of the law as it existed
in 1946. ',139 For support of this proposition, Hand cites his own opinion in S.C.
Johnson & Sons v. Johnson.14 According to Hand, the law prior to the Lanham
Act defined infringement "less literally,"'141 and therefore he was permitted to do
so in American Chicle as well.
Hand's analysis in American Chicle demonstrates a surprising disregard for
the clear language of the Lanham Act and a presumption of the supremacy of
judge-made law over the codified law. This is surprising in light of Hand's pining
132. Id. at 77.
133. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Roberston, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928).
134. 208 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1953).
135. Id. at 563.
136. Memorandum from L. Hand to Swan and A. Hand, at 2 (Oct. 28, 1953) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal).
137. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West 1995).
138. American Chicle Co., 208 F.2d at 562.
139. Id.
140. Id. n.3; see S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949).
141. Id.
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for positive policy in this area of the law. When the law was clearly stated by the
legislature, Hand chose to disregard it.
Hand's apparent contempt for the Lanham Act is really quite gratuitous in
the American Chicle case. Clearly, the "likelihood of confusion" test as conceived
of in the Lanham Act is intended to be less, rather than more, literal as Hand
claimed. That is, the outcome Hand arrived at in American Chicle would have
been more easily supported by a simple "likelihood of confusion" analysis as
courts apply today. Rather, Hand went on to require, in addition to a likelihood
of confusion, a balance of the plaintiff's and the defendant's interests. In
American Chicle, this balancing was manifested by a requirement that a showing
be made that the defendant intentionally attempted to "bring in" plaintiff's buyers.
Perhaps only Hand could apply this analysis and succeed in getting people to
believe that he was being "less literal" than the Lanham Act when in fact he was
doing precisely the opposite. Hand's additional requirement to make a plaintiff
show that defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark was an attempt to "bring in"
plaintiff's buyers was not the law in 1953 and it is not the law today. To call this
analysis "less literal" than the Lanham Act is really quite amazing.
42
Furthermore, in Caron Corp. v. Vivaudou, Inc.,143 Hand refused to uphold an
injunction where the defendant had allegedly copied the black packaging of
perfume used by the plaintiff. The plaintiff manufactured a perfume called
"Narcisse Noir" or Black Narcissu. The plaintiff sold the scent in bottles with
black stoppers and these bottles were sold in black boxes. The defendant sold an
indistinguishable perfume called "Yellow Narcissus" in boxes covered with a
floral pattern. The defendant did use an appreciable amount of black on its boxes
and in its depiction of a yellow narcissus on the boxes. Hand described these facts
in his memorandum to the other judges on this case as "a question so largely of
the eye that I can scarcely deal with it in words."' 44
The unanimous court found no infringement. In the court's opinion, Hand
wrote that "we have no disposition to lay down the limits to a field which is
142. However, it is a fact that in their memoranda to Learned Hand on the American Chicle case, both
Swan and Augustus Hand voted against Learned Hand to reverse the lower court's finding of infringement.
Swan was convinced that the defendant's use of the word "TOPPS" in addition to its use of package designs
similar to the plaintiff's would obviate any likelihood of confusion. Swan concluded that the defendant had
copied the plaintiff's box "as closely as be dared, but... [had] not infringed." Memorandum from Swan to L.
Hand and A. Hand (Oct. 26, 1953) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). Augustus Hand went even
further, stating, in a one paragraph memorandum, that he could see "no basis in this situation for claiming
confusion or unfair competition under the Lanham Act." Memorandum from A. Hand to L. Hand and Swan
(Oct. 23, 1953) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). This is interesting because neither dissented in
the final judgment as written by Learned Hand. Therefore, Hand somehow succeeded in convincing them to
change their votes in this case. This is especially remarkable because of the extreme position both had taken
in their memoranda with regard to the infringement claim.
143. 4 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1925).
144. Memorandum from L. Hand to Rogers and Manton (1924, no further date provided in original)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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inevitably vague, beyond observing that it must be a clear case" and that "[i]f
there were proof of actual confusion, we could correct our naive impressions."'' 45
Not convinced of any actual confusion and apparently swayed by Judge Manton's
argument as articulated in his Memorandum to Hand and Rogers that there was
"nothing indicating an intent to pawn off [plaintiff's] goods,"' 46 Hand voted with
the majority and reversed the injunction. The language of this case, strongly
persuaded perhaps by Manton's harsh treatment of the plaintiff's claim, resulted
in an overly restrictive treatment of the plaintiffs rights. Again, Hand required
a clear showing of intentionally trading off of the plaintiff's goodwill before he
would support an injunction. This case was decided just one year before Yale
Electric-the case that would make Hand famous for his expansive view of
trademarks.
Once again, subsequent common law has actually been very unkind to
Learned Hand. Every court in the United States after 1947 and the passage of the
Lanham Act now recognizes that such actual "patent effort" or actual confusion
by consumers is not necessary to obtain relief; rather, a plaintiff needs only to
demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. Hand's restrictive notion of requiring a
"patent effort" has been completely abandoned and ignored. Furthermore, Hand's
refusal to recognize trademark rights in trade dress has also been dismissed or
expressly found to be overly restrictive by various courts. 147
B. The Aunt Jemima Doctrine
In 1917, Hand was a member of a three judge panel that heard the appeal of
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co. 148 This case became famous in the
Second Circuit as well as in other circuits for the "Aunt Jemima Doctrine." 149 This
doctrine expanded the common law notion of trademarks. Until the Aunt Jemima
Doctrine, confusion, and therefore infringement, was only possible when the
defendant was selling exactly or nearly exactly the same goods on which the
plaintiff used the mark. In Aunt Jemima, the Second Circuit held that the
plaintiffs rights included the right to enjoin use of the same mark on products
that might be expected to come from the plaintiff even if the plaintiff never
produced them. "[W]e think that the goods, though different, may be so related
145. Caron Corp., 4 F.2d at 997.
146. Memorandum from Manton to L. Hand and Rogers (1924, no further date provided in original)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
147. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
148. 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917). cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
149. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 210-11 (D. Md. 1988);
General Controls Co. v. Hi-G, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 152, 159 (D. Conn. 1962); S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v.
Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§
730-731 (1934); Quentin R. Wittrock, Note, Use of Personal Names in Noncompeting Businesses-Doctrines
of Unfair Competition, Trademark Infringement, and Dilution, 70 IOWA L. REv. 995, 1000 (1985).
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as to fall within the mischief which equity should prevent."'t 0 Therefore, the court
held that use of "AUNT JEMIMA" on syrup infringed the plaintiff's use on flour.
Aunt Jemima was the most important and most expansive new grant of
trademark rights known at the time. Particularly significant is the fact that Hand
actually dissented in Aunt Jemima,'' although he is often given credit for
conceiving the doctrine.' 52 Hand felt that Aunt Jemima Mills, the first to use and
register the mark "AUNT JEMIMA" for use on flour, had acquiesced in the
defendant's use on syrup. The plaintiff had actually written a letter to the
defendant prior to litigation that stated that the plaintiff presumed the defendant
could use the mark on syrup without violating any law. t53
Hand dissented based on his understanding of acquiescence in trademark
jurisprudence. Hand cited the leading trademark acquiescence case, Menendez v.
Holt,'t 4 but dismissed it saying it did "not support a contrary doctrine."'55 Hand
felt that because Aunt Jemima Mills had actually written to the defendant saying
it was Aunt Jemima Mills' belief that the defendant's use on syrup did not
infringe the plaintiff's rights, "it surely is wrong to say that.., the defendant
commits a fraud by going on.' 56
Hand's dissent is significant here for several reasons. First, Hand
misrepresents or misstates the law regarding acquiescence. In trademark law, a
plaintiff then and today is considered to have acquiesced to the defendant's use
only when "it has been continued so long, and under such circumstances, as to
defeat the right itself... Acquiescence to avail must be such as to create a new
right in the defendant."' 57 It is difficult to see how one letter, early on in the
encounter, could completely defeat any rights the plaintiff had in the mark.
Clearly, that was not the law then and it is not the law today.
Furthermore, Hand's dissent is unique in his trademark opinions because it
is the rare instance when he allowed his own morality to dictate his proffered
150. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 409-10.
151. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 412. This confusion may have resulted from a typographical error
in the reporter. Even though Hand's vote in the case is in dissent, the substantive comments in his dissent are
opposite those of the majority, and the reporter lists Hand as dissenting, the caption of the case still labels
Hand's opinion as "concurring:' Id. at 413. Mundane as it may appear, this is yet another example of Hand's
reputation outliving and outgrowing what he actually did or said.
152. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 226 F. Supp. 716,729 (W.D. Mich.
1964) ("[Hand] further found that after the 1905 amendment the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit extended the trade-mark act's umbrella of protection in the case of Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney
& Co. [cite omitted]").
153. Id. at 408.
154. 128 U.S. 514 (1888).
155. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 412.
156. Id.
157. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. at 523-24. Today, these facts would never rise to a level of
acquiescence. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 23.24 (citing In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 1362 (C.C.P.A. 1973), for the proposition that a "naked consent" carries little weight in rising to
acquiescence).
1996/ Learned Hand's Trademark Jurisprudence
outcome in the case. Hand strictly construed his role as a judge to mean that he
must apply the law and not apply his own emotions. His dissent in Aunt Jemima
is a rare instance where he crossed this line.
The common law at the time would have allowed Hand (a young and un-
known district court judge at the time) to quietly agree with the majority at least
on the issue of acquiescence. However, Hand chose to take the position that it was
just "wrong"'58 to allow a plaintiff that originally signals a defendant that it does
not consider the defendant's conduct to be an infringement to then change course
and call the defendant's conduct a fraud. This even though Menendez and other
cases would allow for such a distinction provided the plaintiff sub-sequently
reasserted its trademark rights in some way (as the plaintiff did in Aunt Jemima).
Therefore, dissenting in Aunt Jemima, Hand took the rare stance that the law
as written is basically wrong and the plaintiff, morally speaking, should not be
allowed to prevail. He further emphasized that the focus of his dissent was on the
plaintiff's moral conduct because he ended with an express statement that he
dissented only because he felt the facts compelled a denial of the plaintiff's
motion based upon acquiescence, and reserved comment on the plaintiffs
original trademark rights.'59
Hand further expanded the Aunt Jemima Doctrine-even though he had
dissented in that case-into what became known as the Hand Doctrine in 1928
in Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson.'6° As originally conceived, the Hand
Doctrine stood for the principle that if an article bearing a copied symbol was a
product that may be understood to have emanated from the plaintiff, the
defendant's use of such a mark should be enjoined.' 6' As we shall shortly see, the
Hand Doctrine soon came to stand for the exact opposite proposition. 62
Oddly enough, Hand's reputation in trademark jurisprudence largely stems
from Yale Electric; however, after writing the opinion, Hand spent the rest of his
judicial career confining its application.
In Yale Electric, a rather tortured opinion that stands out in his trademark
cases, Hand affirmed the dismissal of a bill in equity to compel the Commissioner
of Patents to register the mark "YALE" as used on flashlights and batteries
because of the prior use of the identical mark by Yale & Towne Manufacturing
Co. on locks and keys. Hand held that "it has come to be recognized that, unless
the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to insure against any
158. See Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 412.
159. Id. at 413.
160. 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
161. Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., Trademark Infringement and Confusion of Source: Need For Supreme Court
Action, 35 VA. L. REV. 214,217 (1949).
162. See infra notes 180-97 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 27
identification of the two, it is unlawful."' 63 Hand cited Aunt Jemima as well as a
host of other cases from other circuits as controlling.
164
Under the Trademark Act of 1905, a registration would be refused if the mark
was used on goods of the same descriptive properties as that of a prior user. 165
Therefore, the inquiry in Yale Electric was whether flashlights and batteries were
of the same descriptive properties as locks and keys. Hand stated that the "heart
of the matter' 6 on this subject was what the trade believed despite the language
of the 1905 Act. Therefore, even though Hand clearly did not believe that locks
and keys were of the same descriptive property as flashlights and batteries, 67
because the trade apparently had come to believe that they were, Hand felt
compelled to "do some violence to the language"of the 1905 Act, and refuse the
registration.1
68
In fact, once again, this case is quite instructive of Hand's judicial
philosophy. Even though he obviously felt that use of a mark on locks and keys
should not be grounds for preventing use of the same mark on flashlights and
batteries, he was constrained by the positive law on the subject. The law, at the
time, was dictated by the Second Circuit's opinion in Aunt Jemima, which he felt
bound to follow, even though he had dissented.
That is, even though Hand clearly would have preferred the opposite outcome
in Yale Electric, he separated his own moral feelings from the inquiry and made
his determination based on existing law. In the process, he even felt he was doing
"violence" to the language of the 1905 Act, but even that did not allow him to
escape the quandary of interpreting the statute as being opposed to the common
law. After all, the 1905 Act was supposed to be a codification of the common
law. 69 Therefore, placed between the two, Hand refused to apply his morals and
instead applied the law from his Circuit.
163. Yale Elec. Corp., 26 F.2d at 974.
164. Id.
165. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 7,33 Stat. 724,726.
166. Yale Elec. Corp., 26 F.2d at 974.
167. See id. ("IF]or the fact that flash-lights and locks are made of metal does not appear to us to give
them the same descriptive properties..
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., American Trading Co. v. H.E. Heacock Co., 285 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1932) (giving priority
to subsequent trademark registration in the Philippines because Congress had the express authority to create
trademark rights there and not in the United States); American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372,
381 (1926); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 99 (1918) ("registration of the
[petitioner's] trade-mark under.., the act of Congress [did not have] the effect of enlarging the rights of
[petitioner] beyond what they would be under common-law principles"). But cf. Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg.
Co., 133 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1943) (stating that Congress had the authority to create substantive trademark
rights and did so in the Act of 1905); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Lever Bros. v. United States and the Legality of
Gray Market Imports: A New Shield for United States Trademark Owners in Transactional Markets, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 571, 575 (1993) ("Congress augmented the protection afforded to mark owners under the
common law by passing the Trademark Act of 1905"); Port, supra note 14, at 527-28.
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This is a contrary result to the same dilemma Hand faced when deciding
Doris Silk in light of the contrary precedent from the Supreme Court in INS. In
that instance, Hand artfully dodged the Supreme Court's precedent. Here,
however, Hand accepted as controlling the Second Circuit's precedent in Aunt
Jemima. This conceptual flip-flop makes the study of Hand's trademark
jurisprudence admittedly slippery. However, one thing is certain. In Hand's later
cases, it became quite clear that Hand wanted to revert trademark jurisprudence
to the form in which it existed prior to Yale Electric. After Yale Electric, and
especially in his later trademark cases, Hand was convinced that there was no
positive policy that had changed the law of trademarks and that a trademark
owner could only recover if it could prove an actual loss of sales or an actual
intent to divert sales.
Although commonly cited in casebooks as well as by other commentators as
typical of Hand's expansive thinking on the subject of trademark law, 7° Yale
Electric actually stands out as an anomaly when compared to the rest of Hand's
trademark jurisprudence. No other Hand opinion goes so far in the application of
the related goods doctrine.
Its closest rival is L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon.'71 In that case, Hand held
that it was "wanton" infringement for the defendant to use the mark
"WATERMAN" on pens when the plaintiff was a well-established manufacturer
of WATERMAN razor blades. In Waterman, Hand again cited Aunt Jemima and
his own Yale Electric as controlling authority for the proposition that the
firstcomer to a mark may enjoin other uses provided such other uses "might
naturally be supposed to come from him."' 72 Even though Hand held in favor of
the expansive view of the related goods doctrine in Waterman, he intentionally
restricted its application and foreshadowed things to come when he stated that the
case rested on the theory that second-comers may not tarnish the reputation of the
firstcomer, and may not interfere with the natural expansion of the firstcomer's
use.
173
The Aunt Jemima Doctrine was also addressed in Emerson Electric Mfg. Co.
v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp.174 There Hand stated that it had become
"settled" that if one merchant establishes a business under a mark used on specific
goods, a second merchant may not use the same mark in selling other goods if the
goods are so like the first merchant's that the public will believe the first
170. See GINSBURG ErAL., supra note 106, at44.
171. 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934).
172. Id. at 273.
173. Id. at 274.
174. 105 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 616 (1939).
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merchant was selling them.t75 Emerson is often cited as supporting the pro-
position that Hand believed in this expansive view of trademarks. 76
In Emerson, the plaintiff had been selling electric motors and related
hardware in the electricity industry for many years. The defendant originally
made phonographs and records. The dispute arose when the defendant expanded
its business to include radios. Unbeknownst to the defendant, the plaintiff had
also attempted to enter the radio field but had apparently not been successful. The
plaintiff never actually marketed any radios but only sold a generator to supply
power to a radio transmitter.
Those that cite Emerson in the canonization of Learned Hand fail to point out
that the plaintiff there actually failed and was harshly criticized by Hand. The
summary of the Hand Doctrine that Hand proffers in the opinion-that is so often
cited and quoted-is very obviously dicta. The entire discussion follows the
introductory clause, "The doctrine upon which the plaintiff must rely .... "
Following that dictum, Hand then ridiculed the plaintiff's position and concluded
that it was "peculiarly without merit" t77 because the defendant could not have
known of the plaintiff's intent to expand into the radio field.
Emerson was an opportunity to apply the Aunt Jemima Doctrine literally. The
original user of the mark was now expanding its use of the mark to related goods.
A newcomer had interfered. If flashlights and batteries were sufficiently similar
to locks, then clearly radios could be called similar enough to the generators that
supplied electricity to power the radio. Hand, however, declined the invitation to
apply Aunt Jemima when he found that no infringement existed in Emerson.
Therefore, it is wrong to conclude that Emerson is in any way supportive of
the Aunt Jemima Doctrine. In fact, even though the facts clearly allowed for its
application, Hand's refusal to do so should rather be read as foreshadowing things
to come. And it did.
After Waterman, however, it appears that Hand drew the line. Subsequent
cases by Hand regarding trademark infringement all take a remarkable shift and
become extremely restrictive. Waterman was the last case where Hand applied the
Aunt Jemima Doctrine to the benefit of the plaintiff. Since 1940, Hand refused to
175. Id. at 910.
176. See, e.g., Freedom Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 583 F. Supp. 544, 551-52 (M.D. Fla 1984)
(citing Hand for his Emerson ruling and applicability of the "Doctrine of Expansion"). aff'd, 757 F.2d 1176
(1 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); Artcraft Novelties Corp. v. Baxter Lane Co. of Amarillo,
685 F.2d 988, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting a statement in Hand's Emerson opinion in reference to the
"expansion of business" doctrine); Palmer v. Gulf Pub. Co., 79 F. Supp. 731, 733-34 (S.D. Cal. 1948);
Stardust, Inc. v. Weiss, 79 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (explaining the application of Hand's extended
protection ruling in Emerson).
177. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 105 F.2d at 911.
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apply the Aunt Jemima Doctrine1 78 and, in fact, worked very diligently the rest of
his judicial career restricting and circumscribing its application.
79
C. The Real Hand Doctrine
Prior to 1940, the so-called "Hand Doctrine" stood for the ideas expressed by
Hand in Yale Electric-that is, if an article bearing a copied trademark was a
product that may be understood to have emanated from the plaintiff, the
defendant's use would be enjoined. Subsequent to 1940, however, the Hand
Doctrine came to identify those cases in which Hand required that actual
confusion or deceit be shown before the plaintiff could prevail. Therefore, Hand
came full circle. Very artfully and with no debate or comment, the Hand Doctrine
after 1940 came to stand for the near opposite proposition-that is, actual
confusion must be shown by the plaintiff to prevail. 80
After 1940, Hand found in favor of the plaintiff in only four of the twelve
trademark opinions he wrote.1 81 In all of those cases, the infringement was
obvious and wanton-precisely satisfying the real Hand Doctrine. After 1940, a
trademark owner had very little chance of success before Learned Hand.
This is not to imply that Hand was not hostile to trademark owners' rights
prior to 1940. In fact, excluding Yale Electric, Waterman and his apparent support
of the Aunt Jemima Doctrine early in his career, Hand continually allowed legal
positivism to influence his perspective on the role of a judge and thereby restrict
the outcome of his trademark cases.
178. Hand refused to apply the Aunt Jemima Doctrine except in the case of Adolph Kastor & Bros., Inc.
v. F.T.C., 138 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1943), which enjoined a defendant from using "SCOUT KNIFE" on
knives in light of the plaintiffs established secondary meaning. In Adolph Kastor, Hand found that there was
evidence to support the finding that the defendant was purposefully "misleading others into supposing that its
goods were countenanced or authorized by the Boy Scouts." Memorandum from L. Hand to Swan and Frank,
at 2 (Oct. 21, 1943) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). Furthermore, Hand states, "[n]obody has
challenged the statute; so why should we?" Id.
179. See S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1949) (containing Hand's express
statement that it was imperative that the Aunt Jemima Doctrine be "circumscribed").
180. Hereinafter this concept is referred to as the "Real Hand Doctrine" to distinguish it from the Hand
Doctrine that at one point meant the holding in Yale Electric.
181. Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that the trademark
"ARTYPE" as used for acetate sheets containing letters and symbols to be cut and used in preparing
advertising copy was valid and infringed by the user of "ART-TYPE" in direct competition); American Chicle
Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 208 F.2d 560, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that even though actual confusion
exists, an injunction issues because of a patent effort to catch unsuspecting purchasers); G.H. Mumm
Champagne v. Eastern Wine Corp., 142 F.2d 499, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1944) (deciding an injunction should issue
upon facts showing that the plaintiff used a red stripe across its label on its bottle of imported champagne and
the defendant did the same on domestic champagne using the same color, essentially imitating the plaintiff's
label), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944); Adolph Kastor & Bros., Inc. v. F.T.C., 138 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir.
1943) (containing Hand's conclusion that the term "SCOUT" as used on pocket knives was a word of common
speech which all are prima facie entitled to use, but because the Boy Scouts had attained secondary meaning
in the mark, they could prevent the use of SCOUT on pocket knives).
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For example, as early as 1927, the year before he wrote the now famous Yale
Electric opinion, Hand refused to allow an injunction in Oakland Chemical Co.
v. Bookman.t82 There, Hand took the unusual position that a mark may be both
suggestive and yet still describe the attribute of the good on which it is used
because "there is no positive policy that forbids the combination."'83 Hand's
concern was that he could "see no reason why a man who wants a trade name
should be allowed to come just as near as he can to monopolizing the tongue and
then say that he only partly succeeded in describing, that he has only half-
described, his goods."' 84 Once again, Hand felt constrained by a lack of what he
perceived of as a "positive policy" that would have allowed him to decide an
issue differently.
Even in cases where the plaintiff prevailed, such as American Medicinal
Spirits Co. v. United Distillers, Ltd.,185 there were foreshadowings of the more
restrictive Learned Hand. There, Hand affirmed an injunction against a defendant
for infringing "BOURBON DE LUXE" as used in connection with the sale of
whiskey. The defendant, Hand argued, had committed "brazen" infringement and
was "trying to prey upon the plaintiff's business."'8 6 As such, this was an easy
case for Hand. There was plenty of positive policy to justify an injunction in such
circumstances.
By 1936, Hand was strictly construing any rights that might be granted a
trademark holder. In Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corp., 187Hand
refused to issue an injunction against the defendant that purposefully used the
plaintiffs mark "UNIVERSAL" on its refrigerators (provided it added
"COOLER" to the mark) because the plaintiff had been in negotiations for eight
years to get the defendant to either jointly manufacture the products or cease use.
Hand said "Equity will not upset what has been founded upon such solid ground
.... ,,188 Therefore the plaintiff was estopped from asserting its trademark rights.
However, Hand later confessed that his handling of the plaintiff's trademark
rights "was a rather vigorous handling of the words of the statute, I confess, but
I am not disposed to go back on it, perhaps because it was my own baby." 189This
remark is surprising because he never mentioned a statute in the Landers opinion,
but seemed to rely exclusively on the acquiescence argument found at common
182. 22 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1927).
183. Id. at 931.
184. Memorandum from L. Hand to Manton and Swan, at 1 (Nov. 17, 1927) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal).
185. 76 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1935).
186. Id. at 125.
187. 85 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1936).
188. Id. at49.
189. Memorandum from L. Hand to Chase and Clark, at 2 (Nov. 18, 1940) (copy on file with the Pacific
Law Journal).
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law. Furthermore, he seems to be implying that he was wrong in Landers and that
some other result may have been appropriate, but that selfish concerns prevailed.
These three cases, however, were just the prelude. After decisively rejecting
the Aunt Jemima Doctrine in S.C. Johnson, Hand reasserted what he believed was
"the Law and the Prophets" on the subject. In American Brake Shoe & Foundry
Co. v. Alltex Products Corp.,19 Hand held that the plaintiff must be able to show
actual confusion before it can prevail. In American Brake Shoe, the defendant
used the mark "NATIONAL BRAKE BLOCK" for brake linings. The plaintiff
argued that this infringed its mark, "AMERICAN BRAKE BLOCK" for the same
product. In fact, there was evidence in the record that unscrupulous repair shops
would substitute the defendant's brake shoes on purpose when the customers
believed they were getting the plaintiffs product.
Hand determined that there was no infringement in this case because the
dealers were getting what they expected. Because the dealers knew of the
deception and were not confused, there could be no infringement because there
was no confusion. Hand stated,* "The use of the name can injure the plaintiff only
in so far as it results in mistaken buying by the last buyer who accepts the goods
because of their name and the [automobile] owner is not such a buyer. To
succeed, the plaintiff was therefore bound to show that repair shops or service
stations were deceived, and that it failed to do."'191
American Brake Shoe is an excellent example of the "Real Hand
Doctrine"--to require actual confusion in the minds of the end user and to
circumscribe and avoid the plaintiff's trademark rights based on "the Law and the
Prophets" of the subject as it existed in 1928.
Even in Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., Inc.,192 where Hand
refused to enjoin the mark "WHITE HOUSE" as used on evaporated milk in
favor of the plaintiff who used the same mark on coffee and tea, Hand's legal
positivism and hostility toward trademark owners is apparent in dicta. Even
though Hand recognized that the defendant had copied the plaintiff's picture of
the "White House" on the label "down to the minutest detail [such] that it [was]
impossible to doubt that.., it copied the original,"' 93 he still refused to issue the
injunction because the plaintiff had not pleaded a cause of action for copyright
infringement. Given the case law in existence at the time, such conduct was
clearly actionable as unfair competition. 94
190. 117 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 631 (1941).
191. Id. at 984-85.
192. 132 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1943).
193. Id. at 826.
194. See, e.g., Grocers Baking Co. v. Siegler, 132 F.2d 498,501 (6th Cir. 1942); Rytex Co. v. Ryan, 126
F.2d 952, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1942); Sutter Packing Co. v. Piggley Wiggly Corp., 64 F.2d 1006, 1007 (C.C.P.A.
1933).
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Hand's opinion in Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co.'9" also
stands out as a strange misstatement of the law of trademarks. There, Hand held
that in order for the plaintiff to protect its trademark "UNCLE SAM'S," it had to
acquire some monopoly in the word, not because the defendant stole customers
by masquerading under the plaintiffs name. And, Hand admits, obtaining
monopoly interests in the word would run counter to the whole basis of the law
on the subject because trademark law never gives property protection to words.
Under this analysis, a trademark owner could never prevail. That is, Hand
claims that in order to prevail, the plaintiff must have a monopoly; however,
monopolies are contrary to the subject of trademarks and abhorred by courts.
Either this is a gross misstatement on behalf of the "greatest judge in the English
speaking world," or Hand himself was confused about "the Law and the
Prophets" on the subject. According to Hand himself, only when a plaintiff shows
that the defendant stole customers by masquerading as the plaintiff can the
plaintiff prevail.' 96 This is a rather large role reversal for the judge that held that
use on locks and keys of one mark precluded registration of the same mark for
use on flashlights and batteries because these products had the same descriptive
properties.' 97
D. The Schizophrenic Second Circuit
Largely based on Hand's judicial philosophy, heavily imbued with legal
positivist rhetoric and Hand's intention of restricting the application of the Aunt
Jemima Doctrine and thereby furthering the Real Hand Doctrine, a substantial
split emerged within the Second Circuit after 1940 that has been described by one
commentator as "judicial schizophrenia."' 98 Hand ultimately became the leader
of the faction in the Second Circuit that strongly believed that trademark
protection should be very carefully circumscribed. Others, such as Hand's cousin,
195. 133 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 211 (1943).
196. Id. at 854.
197. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
198. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.09; see also, DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS,
UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTAL PROPERTY LAW § 5E[3][a] (1992); ef. Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park
Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1953) (finding that "HYDE PARK" as used on women's clothing
did not infringe "HYDE PARK" as used on men's clothing), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953); Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948) (ruling that "MISS SEVENTEEN" as used
on girdles infringes "SEVENTEEN" as used on magazines); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34,
35-37 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that the expression "V-8" used on vitamins infringes the "V-8" used on
vegetable juice).
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Augustus Hand, and Clark, believed in much more liberal application of the Aunt
Jemima Doctrine,199 as well as other trademark doctrines.2°
In 1940, Hand backed away from a common sense application of the related
goods doctrine in S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson.20' In S.C. Johnson, the
plaintiff clearly showed that it had an established market share in floor cleaners,
varnishes, enamels, brushes, lacquers, waxes, and furniture polish. The defendant
used its own name, which happened to be "Johnson" on its fabric cleaner. Hand
upheld the district court's injunction but drastically limited it to read only that the
defendant could not use "JOHNSON" on its products except in combination with
the word "cleaner," or if it included a legend that was equally conspicuous that
said "JOHNSON PRODUCT CO. NEW YORK." Hand admitted that the result
may not be the best for the plaintiff but stated that any other remedy would be
"too drastic."2
Hand analyzed the case in the following manner. The first justification for
granting relief under the related goods doctrine was not satisfied. There was no
evidence that the defendant's use tarnished the plaintiff's reputation in any
manner. Any such damage was future oriented and therefore too speculative to
warrant relief.
The second justification for granting relief under the related goods doctrine
was also unsatisfied. According to Hand, there was no evidence that the plaintiff
was likely to expand into fabric cleaners. He considered this interest "less
palpable." Because S.C. Johnson had no specific intention to expand from
furniture polish to furniture fabric cleaner, Hand refused the injunction because
the goods were too distinct even though he admitted that some confusion might
exist from such use. However, it was Hand's belief that even if such confusion
exists, no one appointed the plaintiff in this action to be their "vicarious
champion."
Finally, Hand concluded, if a plaintiff adopts a name as common as
"Johnson" for use on its products, it must run the risk that another "Johnson" will
come along and will validly, without any attempted unfair competition, want to
put its name on its products.
The absurdity of this result is apparent when immediately juxtaposed with
Hand's prior related goods doctrine cases. That is, even though Hand found
flashlights and batteries to have the same descriptive properties as locks and keys,
and even though he also found razor blades to have the same descriptive
properties as pens, he also found that furniture cleaner was distinct enough from
199. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.09[2].
200. See id. (containing an excellent description of this feud). This may be an example of why the slogan
"Quote Learned, but follow Gus" became popular. See Thomson, supra note 4, at 764 n.3 (assessing the origins
of this slogan).
201. 116 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940).
202. Id. at 430.
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furniture polish that an injunction would not issue even if the public was
deceived.
This factual result was pointed out to Hand while the judges were deliberating
the case. In his memorandum to Hand and Chase, Clark clearly argued that Yale
Electric was "authority for affirming on infringement., 20 3 Hand makes no
mention of Yale Electric in his opinion and does not seem to agree that it dictated
a contrary result here, as Clark felt, even though he did not vote that way. It is
clear, however, that Clark was not convinced that this was the correct outcome.
Upon plaintiff's petition for rehearing, Clark wrote to Hand and Chase to say that
he was "a little nervous about the result here, whether it was not giving the
plaintiff more or less a gold brick." 4
For whatever reason, Hand either changed his mind regarding the related
goods doctrine, as one commentator has suggested,2 5 or decided to assert himself
in what he perceived as the positive common law on the subject. After all, it was
Hand's opinion that the entire "Law and the Prophets" on the subject of
trademarks was simply that one should not represent one's goods as emanating
from another.2 6 As the expansive view of the related goods doctrine violated that
rule, Hand was not prepared to endorse it.
This is supported by Hand's memorandum to the other judges in this case.
Although Hand was much more concerned with the plaintiff's rights than he
articulated in the final opinion," he did state in the memorandum that in Johnson
the plaintiff must rely on the likelihood that the defendant would tarnish the
plaintiff's reputation and that if the plaintiff did decide to expand its business it
would find it already occupied by the defendant. However, Hand concluded that
"I think we may fairly anticipate that the Supreme Court in its present temper will
tend rather to limit than to expand the remedies of merchants for such injuries;
and in any case it is plain that the injury is more remote and that demands less
drastic relief.
'208
Therefore, because of an apparent fear of reversal by the Supreme Court,
even though Hand felt that the plaintiff had "shown that confusion ha[d] already
actually arisen ' and "would say that the defendant ha[d] infringed the mark and
203. Memorandum from Clark to L..Hand and Chase, at 1 (Nov. 18, 1940) (copy on file with the Pacific
Law Journal).
204. Memorandum from Clark to L. Hand and Chase, at 1 (Feb. 7, 1941) (copy on file with the Paciic
Law Journal).
205. MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.09[2].
206. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928).
207. See Memorandum from L. Hand to Chase and Clark, at I (Nov. 18, 1940) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal) ("it is equally plain to my mind that the plaintiff has established a right to some kind of
relief. Not only has it sown a situation in which confusion was likely to arise because of the near relation of
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be [sic] guilty of unfair competition,"2' 0 Hand refused an outright prohibition
even though such an outcome would not have be unprecedented2' 1
This is further made clear in Hand's 1950 opinion in Federal Telephone &
Radio Corp. v. Federal Television Corp.212 There, he expressly stated that
"[a]lthough there appears to be a persistent belief that the first use of a specific
name or description gives a power to the first user to prevent its use by others, it
is important to remember that no such doctrine exists. '213 Hand refused to enjoin
the use of "FEDERAL" as used on televisions even though the plaintiff was well
established in the market place for using the mark "FEDERAL" on radios. Hand
believed that the purchasers of the respective goods were sophisticated enough
that they would not be deceived as to the source of the productsY4 Therefore,
relying on his own opinion from S.C. Johnson, Hand coolly dismissed the notion
that the plaintiff might wish to extend its products to include televisions, found
no actual confusion, and therefore no harm.
In 1949, two years after the Lanham Act was passed, Hand had the
opportunity to revisit the S.C. Johnson case when the original plaintiff re-peti-
tioned the court claiming that the defendant was in violation of Hand's 1940 opin-
ion. Although Hand had refused an injunction in 1940, he did mandate that the
defendant clearly show on its labels that the product was "Johnson's Cleaners"
and "made by Johnson Products Company, Buffalo. N.Y."
In S.C. Johnson 11,215 Hand took the opportunity to very selectively review
and circumscribe the related goods doctrine in light of the recently enacted
Lanham Act. In that case, Hand purported to review the law on the subject in light
of the Lanham Act. However, Hand selectively cited marginal cases of limited
impact and concluded that Congress could not have meant to change his inter-
pretation of trademark law because if they had, they "would have said so more
clearly."
2 16
Hand first correctly identified that the Lanham Act changed the statutory
language regarding the prerequisite for civil liability from one "affix[ing]" the
registered mark "to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties,"
to "'any person who shall in commerce.., use.., any reproduction.., of any
registered mark' which 'use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or deceive
purchasers as to the source or origin' of the goods.2 17 He claimed that this
210. Id. at 2.
211. Id.; see Memorandum from Clark to L. Hand and Chase, at I (Nov. 18, 1940) (copy on file with
the Pacific Law Journal); see also id. (citing Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461 (1914)).
212. 180 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1950).
213. Id. at 251.
214. Id.
215. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (1949) [hereinafter Johnson 11].
216. Id. at 180.
217. Id. at 178 (citing the text of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (1963)).
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changed the law and that the point of S.C. Johnson IH was to clarify what that
change was.218
Unfortunately, Hand did not accomplish this task. Rather, he took the
opportunity to rewrite history to make it appear as though his restrictive
view-the Real Hand Doctrine-was the Law and the Prophets on the subject.
Because Hand found no statutory guidance to the contrary, he felt fully justified
in continuing to pursue his perspective on the issue.
Hand cited a long line of cases, starting from the 1880s, in an apparent
attempt to establish what the common law of the subject was at the time.2 ' 9 The
persuasiveness of this line of cases was undercut by Hand himself when he
admitted that "the weight of the authority was the other way."20
After characterizing the impact of the Lanham Act-which took over ten
years to negotiate and enact-on the law of trademarks as a "change of
diction,, 22' Hand reverted back to his own pre-Lanham Act cases and stated, as
if nothing had changed, that the Aunt Jemima Doctrine must be carefully
circumscribed as only allowing protection of related goods if there was actual
tarnishing of the plaintiff's good will, or if there were a possibility that at some
time in the future the plaintiff would extend his market to include what the
defendant had begun to exploit.
222
Hand had an even more explicit opportunity to interpret and apply the
Lanham Act in American Auto Ass'n v. Spiegel.2 3 In one of the most bizarre,
tortured and simply incorrect applications the Lanham Act has ever suffered,
Hand concluded that the Lanham Act did not give the federal district courts
jurisdiction over cases of unfair competition when the charge of infringement was
"too 'unsubstantial."' 224
Hand's analysis in American Auto Ass'n was first to determine if the
infringement was "substantial." Summarily concluding that it was not, Hand held
that the court did not have jurisdiction under Section 11 14(1)(a) of the Lanham
Act. Hand then went hunting in Section 1121 for language that could justify
giving district courts original jurisdiction in a case of a registered trademark.
After a tortured analysis, Hand concluded that because the infringing conduct was
not "interstate" but rather "intrastate," the district court did not have jurisdiction.
"[W]e should long hesitate to find in [the Lanham Act] warrant for so sweeping
an assertion of Congressional power, adding to the jurisdiction of federal courts
all instances of unfair competition ... , 2 5
218. Id. at 177.
219. Id. at 178-79.
220. Id. at 179.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 180.
223. 205 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1953).
224. Id. at 774.
225. Id.
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Hand concluded that "[w]e are forced to the conclusion that the Act does not
give jurisdiction to the district courts over an action brought by any plaintiff with
whose interstate commerce the defendant has unfairly competed." 6 This was
Hand's conclusion even though Section 1121 of the Lanham Act at that time read
in its entirety as follows:
The district and territorial courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of the United States shall have
appellate jurisdiction, of all actions arising under this chapter, without
regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of
the citizenship of the parties.2 27
Not surprisingly, even though Hand purported to be analyzing the Lanham
Act, he does not quote this language in his opinion. Rather, in regard to Section
1121, Hand merely stated that when such clear language is found in the Act,
"[b]efore yielding to the literal meaning of the words" the court should first look
at the rest of the Act to determine if its intent is made clear elsewhere. When there
is no ambiguity in the statutory language on its face, it is curious Hand would feel
compelled to look elsewhere in the statute-unless he had a hidden agenda.
That hidden agenda was an attempt to keep the law of trademarks as it existed
in 1928 when Hand concluded "the Law and Prophets" on the subject. Hand
could find no express authority or positive policy at common law to expand
federal jurisdiction in this manner. Even though other courts of other circuits had
done so, Hand's Second Circuit had expressly reserved comment on the
subject.m Hand had the opportunity in American Auto Ass'n to expand the law
of trademarks and, predictably, he refused to do so as he was forever reticent to
expand the law of trademarks without a clear positive mandate to do so.
229
Furthermore, one year prior to Hand's opinion in American Auto Ass'n, the
Supreme Court expressly stated in no uncertain terms that the Lanham Act was
intended to confer broad jurisdiction over registered trademarks to the federal
courts.u ° In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the Supreme Court stated as follows:
"The Lanham Act... confers broad jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the
United States ... The district courts of the United States are granted jurisdiction
over all actions 'arising under' the Act .... , ' Hand's opinion, therefore, in
226. Id. at 775.
227. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1121 (West 1949).
228. See Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages Inc., 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951).
229. It is, of course, somewhat surprising that Hand could not find that positive statement of policy in
section 1121 of the Lanham Act as it read then. Hand seemed to be expressing a surprising lack of respect for
the Act by looking at its plain language yet refusing to apply it as such because he could not find any case law
in the Second Circuit that supported him.
230. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,283 (1952).
231. Id.
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American Auto Ass'n is even more striking because not only did he apparently
completely misread the intent of Congress, he also ignored binding Supreme
Court precedent on the precise issue he was addressing.
Hand's opinion in American Auto Ass'n has been harshly criticized.232
However, no one mentions this when considering whether or not Hand was a
great judge. Judge Clark, the lead proponent of the opposing trademark law
faction within the Second Circuit in the 1950s, just three years later gratuitously
stated that American Auto Ass'n had "destructive effects ... upon useful and
respected trade-marks .... ,z Because of the "very restrictive holdings" 2 4in
American Auto Ass'n, Clark called for a re-examination of that case at least by
some tribunal.
Once again, the subsequent course of the common law was not kind to
Learned Hand. Once again, Hand's overly restrictive view of trademark juris-
prudence has been criticized and ignored. Today, jurisdiction is liberally granted
to unfair competition cases based on Section 1121 of the Lanham Act.
No one at the time and few since have been so hostile to the rights of
trademark owners as was Hand 35 This is made clear by his dogged persistence
in adhering to "the Law and the Prophets" on the subject of trademarks: injury
only occurs when sales are intentionally directed away from the plaintiff and to
the defendant.
Since Hand's death in 1961, the Second Circuit actually has become much
more consistent in dealing with related goods doctrine cases.Y6 In fact, the
Second Circuit, as well as most other courts, have returned to the Aunt-Jemima-
Doctrine level of expansive reading, have greatly expanded the view of trade
dress protection,237 have liberally granted federal jurisdiction," and have allowed
a showing of a "likelihood of confusion" rather than the actual confusion Hand
required under the Real Hand Doctrine.
In fact, after Hand's opinion in Yale Electric in 1928, his subsequent
trademark opinions, in which he desperately tried to restrict the expansion of
trademark rights, have been "ignored." 239 Therefore, Hand's thirty-year attempt
232. See, e.g., B.H. Lalone, Jr., Note, Trademarks, Trade Names and Unfair Competition: Federal Non.
Diversity Jurisdiction in Actionsfor Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946: American
Automobile Association v. Spiegel, 39 CoRNELL L.Q. 351,353 (1954) ("This narrow technical construction,
suggesting that trademark rights can be infringed only by the use of the mark in connection with goods (i.e.,
as a 'trade-mark') and not in connection with services (i.e., as a 'service mark') greatly delimits the
effectiveness of the Act").
233. Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1956).
234. Id.
235. But see supra note 82.
236. See MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.09[3-4].
237. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2759-60 (1992).
238. Because so many cases make this rule plain, citation would be pedantic.
239. McCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.09[3].
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to confine Aunt Jemima and otherwise restrict trademark rights appears to have
failed.
Hand's judicial theory was heavily influenced by legal positivism. Unless he
was clearly directed by positive policy tq change the law as he saw it from 1928
and earlier, he would not accept the more expansive version of trademark rights.
Because he never truly accepted the Aunt Jemima Doctrine nor the changes to
trademark law that occurred over his fifty years on the bench, he apparently never
moved beyond "the Law and the Prophets" of the subject as it existed in 1928.
Therefore, Hand was actually one of the most hostile judges trademark owners
could face.
VII. CONCLUSION
Learned Hand's trademark cases are really quite troubling. Before 1940,
Hand was occasionally willing to expand the substantive area of the law;
however, after 1940, he became more hostile to the rights of trademark owners.
Hand dissented from Aunt Jemima, the leading case in the related goods field,
later applied and even expanded it in Yale Electric, but then spent the rest of his
career circumscribing it. Hand harshly interpreted the test for infringement. Even
though today a mere "likelihood of confusion" is sufficient, Hand believed that
"the Law and the Prophets" on the subject required the plaintiff to show actual
harm, actual loss of sales, or actual taking of customers. Hand also had a very
narrow and restrictive view on granting liberal jurisdiction to the federal courts
for trademark cases. All of the positions he took regarding substantive trademark
jurisprudence are today criticized and are either not applied or just ignored. In
fact, a litigant today must be very careful in citing Hand trademark cases because
most are no longer good law.
The reason Hand was so restrictive of trademark rights appears to stem from
the legal positivist rhetoric in his opinions. Most of his cases indicate that he
would have arrived at a different outcome but for the fact that he felt constrained
by "the Law and the Prophets" on the subject. If Hand were the great judge he is
given credit for being, rather than be constrained by "the Law and the Prophets"
from 1928, one would have expected him to grow and expand as United States
trademark jurisprudence grew and expanded during Hand's tenure on the Second
Circuit. Rather, American trademark jurisprudence grew and expanded without
Hand-or may be in spite of him.
Without a clear positive policy statement from the legislature, Hand could not
conceive of expanding trademark rights. Clearly, Hand felt that granting these
new rights and creating new protections should come from somewhere else.
Where that clear expression of positive policy should have come from is unclear.
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When the Congress finally enacted the Lanham Act in 1946, Hand characterized
the clear substantive changes it represented as a simple "change of diction."240
This reluctance to create new law, to be innovative, and to expand trademark
law is contrary to Hand's general reputation. However, even though Hand's
perspective on these issues has long been abandoned and ignored as wrong and
misguided, commentators still insist on the canonization of Hand. Clearly, Hand's
trademark opinions do not deserve such deference.
Returning to Posner's test of contribution,241 except for Yale Electric, one
cannot say that Hand had any meaningful contribution to the development of
trademark law except as an advocate of "the Law and Prophets" from 1928. Hand
should not be quickly judged a great trademark judge because Hand himself spent
over 30 subsequent years circumscribing Yale Electric-the very case that made
him famous in the field.
240. Johnson II, 175 F.2d 176, 179 (1949).
241. See Posner, supra note 5.
